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EVIDENTIARY ANALYSES OF 
PRECUSTODIAL SILENCE IN LIGHT OF 
SALINAS V. TEXAS 
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In the recent Supreme Court case Salinas v. Texas, the Court declined 
to answer whether precustodial silence should be admissible as evidence of 
a defendant’s guilt. This Comment uses the case as an example from which 
it argues that courts should take a different approach to precustodial 
silence. Rather than examining a defendant’s precustodial silence from a 
constitutional perspective, as many courts, including the Supreme Court, 
have done, this Comment argues that courts would be better served 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: you are a young immigrant who 
recently came to the United States.1 You have moved into a poor, crime-
ridden neighborhood in New York City. You intend to stay, at least 
temporarily, because the cost of rent is low and other immigrants of your 
ethnicity live in the area. One Friday night, you are invited to an 
acquaintance’s home to celebrate his twenty-fifth birthday. The party spirals 
out of control, and amidst the commotion, gunshots ring out in the house. 
You and the other guests quickly leave the premises. 
The next morning, police officers knock on your door. They tell you 
someone at the party last night was murdered and want to question you 
about the incident as a “person of interest.” They ask you to come to the 
police station for brief questioning. You oblige. You answer their questions 
until they ask you whether you saw anyone suspicious at the party. You 
 
1 This scenario is loosely based on the facts in Salinas v. Texas, the case that is the 
subject of this Comment. 
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think you saw someone you know carrying a gun, but you are unsure and 
you do not want to falsely implicate him. Furthermore, if word were to get 
out in the neighborhood that you are a snitch, it could cut you off from the 
only friends and network you have in this country. In response to this 
question, “you shuffle[] [your] feet, [bite your] bottom lip, [clench your] 
hands in [your] lap, and [begin] to tighten up.”2 The police questioning 
becomes increasingly persistent, and sweat breaks out on your forehead. 
You refuse to answer the question, and decide to leave the police station. 
Soon after, the police arrest you for the murder. 
Can a prosecutor use your silence against you in the subsequent trial 
for murder? In Salinas v. Texas, the Court presumably sought to resolve this 
question when it certified the question presented as “whether the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination prohibits a 
prosecutor from using a defendant’s precustodial3 silence as evidence of his 
guilt.”4 In the plurality opinion written by Justice Alito, the Court declined 
to answer this question, instead rejecting Salinas’s Fifth Amendment claim 
because he did not expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent.5 The plurality held that Salinas was “required to assert the privilege 
in order to benefit from it.”6 Thus, because Salinas never said, “I have the 
right to remain silent,” “I plead the Fifth,” or some other combination of 
 
2 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (illustrating how Salinas dealt with 
police questioning).  
3 What constitutes a “custodial” interview is up for debate. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298, 315 (1985) (citing potential confusion over whether police questioning in the 
living room of a suspect who has not been told he is under arrest amounts to a custodial 
interrogation). However, note that the Supreme Court has held that the right to remain silent 
from Miranda is not triggered by a custodial interrogation: it is triggered by suspect’s receipt 
of the required warnings. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1982). See infra Part II(a) 
for more on what constitutes custody for these purposes.  
4 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
5 Id. at 2180. Many courts, including the Supreme Court, inquire whether the defendant 
“reasonably invoked” his right to remain silent. For example, in Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 
1562, 1568 (1st. Cir. 1989), the First Circuit held that a prosecutor’s use of a defendant’s 
precustodial silence as substantive evidence of their guilt violates their Fifth Amendment 
right. The court stressed that Fifth Amendment privileges must be claimed in some form and 
further reasoned, “in determining whether the privilege has been invoked, the ‘entire context 
in which the claimant spoke must be considered.’” Id. at 1565 (quoting United States v. 
Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1972)). The Supreme Court strengthened this 
invocation requirement in the post-arrest context in 2010 in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. 
Ct. 2250 (2010). Additionally, in Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162–63 (1955), the 
Supreme Court noted that “[i]f an objection to a question is made in any language that a 
committee may reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt to invoke the privilege, it 
must be respected both by the committee and by a court in a prosecution . . . .” 
6 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
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similar language during questioning and prior to being in police custody, he 
could not claim Fifth Amendment protections.7 
The Fifth Amendment states that “no person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” The Supreme Court 
has held that this provision prohibits the prosecution from using a 
defendant’s decision not to testify at trial as evidence of his guilt.8 The 
Court has also held that the same provision applies to a defendant’s choice 
to remain silent during a custodial interrogation.9 But the Supreme Court 
has yet to provide guidance regarding the admissibility of precustodial 
silence, resulting in “a large gray area in the law.”10 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Salinas criticized the plurality for 
failing to hold that precustodial silence is admissible for substantive use, 
meaning as evidence of a defendant’s guilt.11 Relying heavily on Fifth 
Amendment language and jurisprudence, Justice Thomas argued that 
Salinas’s claim should fail “even if he had invoked the privilege” because 
the prosecutor’s comments regarding Salinas’s silence to the jury did not 
compel Salinas to give incriminating testimony.12 Justice Thomas 
concluded Salinas did not have the constitutional right to not have his 
precustodial silence used against him at trial.13 Lower courts often rely on 
approaches similar to Justice Thomas’s constitutional reading when 
 
7 In Salinas, the Court said there is “no ritualistic formula” necessary to claim the 
privilege but simply “remaining silent” is not enough in most instances. Id. at 2181, 2186. 
The plurality in Salinas held that subject to a few narrow exceptions, one must expressly 
invoke their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in precustodial circumstances. The 
Court invoked Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 425, 427 (1984), where it had previously 
ruled that a “witness who desires its protection ‘must claim it.’” Id. at 2178 (citing Murphy, 
465 U.S. at 427). When one fails to invoke the privilege, the silence or answers are properly 
admitted into the trial. Most importantly, the Court states “a defendant normally does not 
invoke the privilege by remaining silent,” relying on its decision in Roberts v. United States, 
445 U.S. 552, 560 (1980). Id. at 2181. According to the Salinas plurality, only two 
exceptions exist to the general rule that one must invoke their right to remain silent in a 
precustodial context. Id. at 2179. First, the defendant need not take the stand and assert the 
privilege at his own trial. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–15 (1965). Second, 
government coercion sometimes makes the privilege attach automatically. See, e.g., Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467−68 & n.37 (1966). 
8 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. 
9 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984). 
10 Justin I. Hale, Weitzel v. State of Maryland: Turning Gray Into Black and White—The 
Evidentiary Analysis Approach to Pre-arrest Silence, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 429, 435 
(2005). 
11 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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permitting a prosecutor to use a defendant’s silence as substantive evidence 
of guilt at trial.14 
Justice Breyer’s Salinas dissent similarly relied on Fifth Amendment 
language and jurisprudence to reach a contrary conclusion.15 Breyer argued 
that allowing a prosecutor to comment on a suspect’s silence “would 
undermine the basic protection that the Fifth Amendment provides,” and 
concluded that those in precustodial circumstances should not have to 
expressly invoke their Fifth Amendment rights.16 
While the entire Salinas Court assessed the admissibility of 
precustodial silence from a constitutional standpoint,17 this Comment 
instead examines the arguments from an evidentiary perspective. It explains 
the relevance of precustodial silence and its potential to have an unfairly 
prejudicial impact according to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Traditionally, courts have only alluded to this type of analysis.18 Courts 
may use this evidentiary analysis to answer whether precustodial silence 
should be used as substantive evidence19 of a person’s guilt. 
This Comment argues that courts should use an evidentiary analysis 
rather than a constitutional analysis and determine issues of precustodial 
silence admissibility on a case-by-case basis. When faced with a suspect’s 
precustodial silence, courts should adhere to standard evidentiary law in 
determining whether a suspect’s silence in a particular case is probative of 
guilt,20 and if it is, weigh its probative value against the potential for unfair 
prejudice.21 This Comment also provides support for the proposition that 
 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1567–68 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124, 
1129–30 (D.C. Cir. 1991). These cases all hold that the Fifth Amendment allows prosecutors 
to use prearrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of the suspect’s guilt.  
15 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2185. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
16 Id.  
17 Fifth Amendment language and jurisprudence is often referred to as the “constitutional 
approach” or “constitutional analysis” in this Comment. 
18 See, e.g., People v. Rogers, 68 P.3d 486, 492 (Colo. App. 2002); State v. Moore, 965 
P.2d 174, 179 (Idaho 1998). These cases primarily utilize constitutional analyses but allude 
to evidentiary analyses of precustodial silence as well. 
19 “Substantive use” of evidence refers to evidence offered to prove actual facts in 
question, rather than to attack a witness or party’s credibility (impeachment evidence). See 
FED. R. EVID. 607 for an example of when evidence is used for impeachment purposes; see 
also subparts I(A(2)(i–ii)) for a more in depth analysis of substantive and impeachment use 
of evidence. As used in this Comment, “substantive use” means “as evidence of guilt.” Jane 
Elinor Notz, Prearrest Silence as Evidence of Guilt: What You Don’t Say Shouldn’t Be Used 
Against You, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (1997).  
20 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
21 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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precustodial silence is rarely probative of guilt, and thus this Comment 
argues that a court’s application of the aforementioned balancing test should 
usually result in the exclusion of such evidence. 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the Fifth Amendment, 
including its application to precustodial and custodial settings. Additionally, 
Part I contains a brief description of what courts have termed a “custodial” 
setting, in which defendants have a Fifth Amendment right to not have their 
silence used against them, as established in Miranda.22 Part I also examines 
the use of silence for both impeachment and substantive purposes, and 
considers how Salinas fits into this broader discussion. Finally, Part I 
describes the current method most courts use to determine the admissibility 
of precustodial silence: the constitutional approach. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the evidentiary approach to 
admissibility of precustodial silence. It argues that while more research is 
needed, existing research indicates that silence should usually not be 
admitted as evidence because it is rarely relevant (i.e., not probative of 
guilt). Furthermore, even in rare instances where it is relevant, it is unfairly 
prejudicial. Thus, silence should rarely be admissible as substantive 
evidence of a suspect’s guilt in a criminal trial. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Fifth Amendment protects against abuses of governmental 
authority.23 Courts have applied Fifth Amendment protections in many 
situations where individuals may incriminate themselves. Aside from 
finding that the Amendment protects one’s right to not take the stand at 
one’s own trial, courts have also extended this privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination to coercive situations (like custodial interrogations).24 
 
22 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
23 Amendment V, THE CHARTERS OF FREEDOM, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/
charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4EFS-TBJG (explaining 
that the States expressed a desire to create an amendment that would prevent an abuse of 
their powers). 
24 See supra text accompanying note 9. The privilege applies whether the witness is in a 
federal court or, under the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment, in a state 
court. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). It also applies regardless of whether the 
proceeding is civil or criminal in nature. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); 
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (stating that custodial interrogation is initiated by law 
enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 
of movement before being questioned as to the specifics of the crime). There are several 
examples of the Supreme Court invalidating the use of evidence when it was obtained under 
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Examining the Framers’ purpose when they drafted the Amendment is 
one way to better understand the privilege today. At least one scholar 
concludes that the “drafters of the Fifth Amendment never envisioned such 
a broad interpretation of the [Amendment’s] language,” especially in out-
of-court terms.25 The Framers certainly did not develop the Fifth 
Amendment for guilty people to mislead the justice system.26 But to what 
extent is the Fifth Amendment intended to protect the innocent? One 
popular theory asserts that the Fifth Amendment is intended to uphold the 
values of the adversary system.27 According to this line of reasoning, the 
prosecution should be forced to prove its case without any help from the 
defendant.28 
1. Miranda v. Arizona 
Other experts argue the Fifth Amendment is designed to deter police 
misconduct, like delaying formal arrest or the delivery of Miranda 
warnings.29 A variety of similar actions may ensure that a defendant’s 
silence is admissible. For example, since the early twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court has held inadmissible confessions obtained through torture 
or coercion.30 Another primary theory is that the Fifth Amendment is meant 
to prevent individuals from facing the “‘cruel trilemma’ of incriminating 
himself, perjuring himself under oath, or being held in contempt of court by 
refusing to answer in an interrogation.”31 
 
coercive circumstances. For example, in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239–42 (1940), 
the Court held a confession obtained after five days of prolonged questioning, during which 
time the defendant was held without being allowed to speak to others, to be coerced. In 
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 150 (1944), the suspect had been interrogated 
continuously for thirty-six hours under electric lights. In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 
503, 514 (1963) the Court held that an “unfair and inherently coercive context” including a 
prolonged interrogation rendered a confession inadmissible.  
25 See Adam M. Stewart, The Silent Domino: Allowing Pre-arrest Silence As Evidence of 
Guilt and the Possible Effect on Miranda, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 189, 207 (2004). 
Historically, the protection against compelled self-incrimination was directly related to the 
ability to challenge official government ideology relating to political and religious freedom. 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 82–83 (1998).  
26 Stewart, supra note 25, at 205. 
27 See Notz, supra note 19, at 1019. 
28 Id. at 1020. 
29 See Sara Ciarelli, Comment, Pre-arrest Silence: Minding That Gap Between Fourth 
Amendment Stops and Fifth Amendment Custody, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 651, 654–
55 (2003) (“[S]ome scholars have viewed [the Fifth Amendment] as a relic from 17th 
century efforts to abolish the coercive questioning practices of Ecclesiastical courts.”). 
30 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). 
31 Ciarelli, supra note 29, at 655 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in 
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Frequent disputes over the Fifth Amendment’s purpose and evolving 
case law have formed the “right to remain silent” as we know it today.32 In 
the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court broadened the application of 
the Fifth Amendment,33 paving the way for the landmark case Miranda v. 
Arizona.34 In Miranda, the Court extended the Fifth Amendment privilege 
to custodial settings due to their coercive nature.35 The Court stated that 
“the prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”36 
The Court further stated that these “procedural safeguards” include 
informing individuals of their rights to (1) remain silent, (2) consult with an 
attorney and have an attorney present during questioning, and (3) have an 
attorney appointed if they cannot afford one.37 Such safeguards are 
commonly known as “Miranda rights.” 
The opinion did not provide definitive guidance regarding precustodial 
situations.38 Therefore, Miranda created a significant distinction between an 
individual’s Fifth Amendment rights in precustodial and custodial contexts. 
 
Historical Perspective, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 181, 185–90 (R.H. Helmholz, et al. eds., 1997)).  
32 Id. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). In Murphy, the 
Court stated that the privilege against self-incrimination “reflects many of our fundamental 
values and most noble aspirations . . . . our respect for the inviolability of the human 
personality and of the right of each individual ‘to a private enclave where he may lead a 
private life . . . .’” Id. (citation omitted).   
33 Ciarelli, supra note 29, at 655–56.  
34 Id. at 656. Though the Court in Miranda v. Arizona did not discuss the particular 
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, it is Miranda v. Arizona that gave us our present-day 
“Miranda right(s)” to remain silent. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr. & Lisa A. Rich, A History of 
Miranda and Why It Remains Vital Today, 40 VAL. U. L. REV., 685, 693–94 (2006). 
35 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456–58 (1966) (reasoning custodial 
interrogations are inherently coercive and require Fifth Amendment protection). 
36 Id. at 444. 
37 Id. at 473. However, this was a limited extension, as the Court explicitly stated that its 
decision did not affect “on-the-scene questioning” and other preliminary inquiries intended 
to initiate police investigations. Id. at 477–78 (differentiating between preliminary 
questioning and custodial investigations that occur post-arrest). Additionally, a subsequent 
Supreme Court case also stood for the proposition that a person in custody is entitled to all 
the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 
(1984). 
38 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Lisa Savadjian, Student Scholarship, 
Silence Should Not Speak Louder Than Words: The Use of Pre-arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence 
as Substantive Evidence of Guilt 26 (Seton Hall Law, Working Paper No. 299, 2013), 
available at http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1299&context=
student_scholarship, archived at http://perma.cc/3M4S-BX8X.  
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While Miranda has been sharply criticized in subsequent decisions,39 the 
Supreme Court has consistently held that if the defendant explicitly invoked 
his right to remain silent while in custody,40 the prosecution may not use 
that silence as evidence of guilt.41 
Subsequent court decisions have further clarified what constitutes a 
“custodial interrogation.” Generally, a person detained in jail or under arrest 
is deemed to be in custody.42 In less obvious scenarios, it may be more 
difficult to ascertain whether a person is “in custody.” To determine 
whether a person is in custody one must ascertain, given all of the 
“circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” how the person would have 
gauged his freedom of movement.43 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a circuit split has developed over whether a 
prosecutor can make use of a defendant’s precustodial silence in its case-in-
chief.44 The Salinas plurality declined to answer this question, leaving the 
circuit courts divided for the foreseeable future. 
 
39 Stewart, supra note 25, at 195–96 (listing increasing number of exceptions to 
Miranda). The primary exception to the Miranda holding is the exception for admitting 
statements for impeachment purposes, even if the statement was in violation of Miranda. Id. 
at 195. 
40 One must explicitly invoke their right to remain silent in custodial situations. See 
supra note 5 for discussion of Berghuis v. Thompkins.  
41 See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (upholding Miranda v. Arizona). But see 
Stewart, supra note 25, at 196–97 (arguing that Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000), “feebly” upheld Miranda and asserted that the rights under that case were 
constitutional in nature). 
42 See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1123 (1983) for more information on what 
constitutes a “custodial” interrogation.  
43 Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 
U.S. 318, 322–23, 325 (1994)).  
44 The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that admission of such 
evidence violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Coppola v. 
Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding petitioner’s statement was a clear invocation 
of his Fifth Amendment right to silence and therefore the admission violated his right against 
self-incrimination); U.S. ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding the 
Fifth Amendment right applied equally to defendant’s silence before trial and arrest); Combs 
v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the use of defendant’s prearrest silence 
as substantive evidence of guilt violates Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 
(10th Cir. 1991) (relying on Griffin to hold that any comment on silence during trial is 
inappropriate, even though the exact language of Griffin was limited to prohibiting 
commentary on a defendant’s failure to take the stand and testify). Conversely, the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have held admission of silence as substantive evidence of guilt 
does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege. See United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 
678 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1567–68 (11th Cir. 1991).  
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2. Use of Silence as Evidence: Impeachment and Substantive Use 
Regardless of whether an individual’s silence occurs pre- or post-
custody, there is a significant difference between using silence for 
impeachment and substantive purposes. If a witness testifies at trial, he or 
she may be impeached by an attorney on either side of the case. Evidence 
proffered to impeach a witness is intended to undermine the credibility of 
his or her testimony. Meanwhile, evidence used “substantively”  helps a 
factfinder determine whether a suspect is guilty or innocent.45 Two seminal 
Supreme Court cases, Jenkins v. Anderson46 and Griffin v. California,47 
illustrate how the rules for proffering evidence of one’s silence apply in 
each of these circumstances. 
i. Impeachment Use of Precustodial Silence: Jenkins v. Anderson 
In the impeachment context, when a defendant testifies at trial, the 
prosecutor may attempt to undermine the defendant’s credibility by 
introducing his previous silence, if doing so would challenge the 
defendant’s statements on direct examination. For example, imagine that 
the police, prior to trial, asked a burglary suspect whether he had seen 
anyone enter his neighbor’s home, and the suspect remained silent in 
response to the question. Subsequently, the suspect testified at trial that he 
saw someone enter the home on the night in question. As this testimony 
would be inconsistent with the suspect’s previous silence, the prosecutor 
could introduce evidence of that earlier silence. In doing so, the prosecutor 
would impeach the defendant by questioning the defendant’s credibility. 
Juries are prohibited from drawing inferences of guilt from evidence used 
for impeachment purposes.48 
In Jenkins,49 the Supreme Court held that the use of precustodial 
silence for impeachment purposes does not violate the Fifth Amendment.50 
 
45 See supra note 19 for further information on impeachment and substantive use of 
evidence.  
46 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (holding that precustodial silence may be used for impeachment 
purposes).  
47 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that it is a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
rights for the prosecutor to comment to the jury on the defendant’s declining to testify, or for 
the judge to instruct the jury that such silence is substantive evidence of guilt). 
48 See supra note 19. 
49 In Jenkins, the defendant stabbed a man to death and fled the scene, but was 
apprehended by police two weeks later. At trial, the defendant claimed self-defense. The 
prosecutor questioned the defendant as to why he did not explain to the arresting officer that 
he acted in self-defense. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the prosecution’s 
comment on his silence violated his Fifth Amendment right. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 234.  
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The Court applied an impermissible burden test51 to determine whether 
society’s interest in preserving the truth-seeking function of trials outweighs 
an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights.52 Under this test, the Court 
weighed the legitimacy of law enforcement practices—ascertaining truth in 
trials—against the extent to which that practice impairs the policies behind 
the Fifth Amendment.53 In holding that the prosecutor’s use of Jenkins’s 
silence to impeach Jenkins’s credibility during trial did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court reasoned that some burden on Fifth Amendment 
privilege is allowable.54 The Court stated that the defendant’s precustodial 
silence could be used against him for impeachment purposes because no 
governmental action compelled an individual to remain silent while he was 
not in custody.55 
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion,56 rejected Jenkins’s Fifth 
Amendment claim “because the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination is simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent 
when he is under no official compulsion to speak.”57 Stevens further 
reasoned that because the precustodial context involves “no official 
compulsion whatever,” there is no reason why a “voluntary decision to do 
one or the other should raise any issue under the Fifth Amendment.”58 
ii. Substantive Use of Precustodial Silence: Griffin v. California 
While the Jenkins holding affirmed the use of a defendant’s 
precustodial silence in the impeachment context only, the decision supplied 
strong constitutional arguments for prohibiting the substantive use of such 
evidence. When a defendant’s silence is introduced as substantive evidence, 
the defendant usually has exercised his right not to testify at trial.59 The 
 
50 See id. at 240. For example, a court can allow impeachment use of prior silence if they 
determine that it is inconsistent with his present statements, and thus probative of the 
defendant’s credibility on a certain issue. Id. at 239. 
51 See id. at 250. This test was first alluded to by the Court in Raffel v. United States, 271 
U.S. 494 (1926). 
52 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236–37; see also Notz, supra note 19, at 1018. 
53 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238.  
54 Id. at 240–41. Jenkins has been reaffirmed and extended in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 
603, 606 (1982). 
55 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240. 
56 It is notable that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later relied on Justice Stevens’s 
Jenkins concurrence when deciding Salinas. Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2012). 
57 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
58 Id. at 243–44. 
59 Meaghan Elizabeth Ryan, Note, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: The 
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prosecutor may introduce evidence of the defendant’s silence to suggest 
knowledge of guilt or prove some other element of the crime.60 Prosecutors 
and juries may fallaciously assume that innocent suspects will profess their 
innocence in the precustodial questioning context.61 
The critical difference between impeachment and substantive uses of 
evidence lies in the decision by the suspect-turned-defendant not to take the 
stand at trial.62 If the defendant does not take the stand, the prosecutor will 
have no opportunity to impeach the defendant, and must proffer such 
evidence in its case-in-chief instead.63 
The Court prohibited the substantive use of a suspect’s silence in the 
trial context in Griffin v. California. While Griffin involved a defendant 
who elected not to take the stand at his trial, there is a strong argument that 
the Court may extend the Griffin holding to precustodial contexts in the 
future 
In Griffin, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits a 
prosecutor from commenting on a defendant’s decision not to testify at 
trial.64 The prosecutor in Griffin expressly suggested that the jury draw a 
negative inference from the defendant’s choice not to take the stand.65 The 
Court reasoned that commenting on the refusal to testify harkens back to 
the “inquisitorial system of criminal justice” that the Fifth Amendment 
outlawed.66 The Court relied on the “penalty doctrine”67 in holding that 
comment by a prosecutor on a defendant’s silence violates the Fifth 
Amendment; permitting such comment is akin to a court-imposed “penalty” 
following a defendant’s exercise of a constitutional privilege.68 
 
Substantive Use of Pre-Miranda Silence, 58 ALA. L. REV. 903, 905 (2007). 
60 Id. (citing United States v. Frazier, 394 F.3d 612, 618–20 (8th Cir. 2005)).  
61 Id. 
62 See United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
63 There is also the chance that the defendant testifies to his own silence, in which case 
the prosecutor cannot impeach either. However, this situation is outside the scope, as this 
Comment focuses on the factual circumstances in which a defendant does not want his 
silence to be admissible. 
64 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965). 
65 Id. at 610. 
66 Id. at 614 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). 
67 This term is used by some legal scholars to describe the Court’s holding that the Fifth 
Amendment guarantees not just freedom from traditionally prohibited forms of compulsion 
(e.g., torture), but “the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the 
unfettered exercise of his own will” and the right “to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.” 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Reconceptualizing the Fifth 
Amendment Prohibition of Adverse Comment on Criminal Defendants’ Trial Silence, 71 
OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 245 (2010).  
68 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614 (“[W]hat the jury may infer, given no help from court, is one 
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The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have extended the 
Court’s reasoning in Griffin to bar the substantive use of precustodial 
silence.69 As previously noted, Miranda extended the Fifth Amendment 
privilege beyond the trial context70 to the custodial context.71 In broadly 
applying the penalty doctrine, these courts further reasoned that an 
individual’s precustodial silence also cannot be used to penalize a suspect-
turned-defendant.  
These circuit courts often relied on constitutional arguments. For 
example, in Coppola v. Powell, the First Circuit reasoned that “the 
protection of the fifth amendment is not limited to those in custody or 
charged with a crime.”72 The court further noted that “[t]he privilege against 
self-incrimination serves as a protection to the innocent as well as to the 
guilty, and we have been admonished that it should be given a liberal 
application.”73 The court also attempted to examine the Framers’ intention 
behind the Fifth Amendment.74 In sum, at least four circuit courts hold that 
a prosecutor may not proffer evidence of a defendant’s precustodial silence 
to infer guilt at trial.75 
When making constitutional arguments regarding the admissibility of 
precustodial silence, courts often analyze the amount of compulsion on a 
defendant to determine if his Fifth Amendment rights have been violated. 
This is because the Amendment’s plain language protects a criminal 
defendant from being compelled to testify against himself. Notably, some 
 
thing. What it may infer when court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence 
against him is quite another.”).  
69 See supra note 44. 
70 Notz, supra note 19, at 1016 (explaining the privilege may be asserted in any situation 
where the defendant may make self-incriminating statements that could be used against him 
in a criminal proceeding). 
71 See supra text accompanying notes 35–37. 
72 878 F.2d 1562, 1566 (1st Cir. 1989). 
73 Id. (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)) (citation 
omitted).  
74 Id. (citation omitted). 
75 Like federal circuit courts, state courts have not reached consistent results on the 
substantive use of precustodial silence. State courts usually discuss the implications of 
precustodial silence under their own state constitutions and rules of evidence. For example, 
Alaska’s state constitution bars the use of pre-Miranda silence. See Nelson v. State, 691 P.2d 
1056, 1059 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). Further discussion of the state court split is outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
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Supreme Court justices have since criticized the Griffin decision76 on 
grounds that no government compulsion existed for Griffin to testify.77 
3. Examining the Constitutional Approach to Precustodial Silence Further: 
Baxter v. Palmigiano 
Another prominent Fifth Amendment case focused on compulsion 
when a defendant remained silent in a custodial setting. In Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he compulsion upon [the 
jailed defendant/petitioner] is . . . obvious . . . . [The defendant] was told 
that criminal charges might be brought against him. [The defendant] was 
also told that anything he said in the disciplinary hearing could be used 
against him in a criminal proceeding.”78 The Court stated that “the 
possibility of self-incrimination was just as real and the threat of a penalty 
just as coercive.”79 Thus, the Court invoked Griffin’s holding that it was 
“constitutional error under the Fifth Amendment to instruct a jury in a 
criminal case that it may draw an inference of guilt from a defendant’s 
failure to testify about facts relevant to his [or her] case.”80 Compulsion is 
referenced directly in Fifth Amendment language and thus courts that 
reference compulsion make a constitutional argument regarding the 
admissibility of silence.  
The holdings in Jenkins, Griffin, and Baxter use the language of 
compulsion to reach their holdings on the admissibility of silence as 
substantive and impeachment evidence.81 Whether circumstances “compel” 
a suspect to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege is the main dispute 
between the parties in these cases. Courts have used this factor to determine  
whether precustodial silence may be used substantively at trial.82 
 
76 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331–41 (1999) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
77 Ciarelli, supra note 29, at 661–62 (explaining that some Supreme Court justices 
oppose the extension of Griffin).  
78 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 333 (1976). 
79 Id. 
80 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965). 
81 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980); Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614; Baxter, 
425 U.S. at 333. Jenkins held that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of 
precustodial silence to impeach a criminal defendant’s credibility. 447 U.S. at 231. Griffin 
held that the Fifth Amendment is violated when a prosecutor comments on a suspect’s 
failure to testify as substantive evidence of his guilt. 380 U.S. at 609. 
82 See supra note 44. 
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B. SALINAS V. TEXAS 
The Jenkins and Griffin holdings leave open the question of whether 
substantive use of precustodial silence violates the Fifth Amendment.83 This 
was the issue before the Supreme Court in Salinas v. Texas.84 Police 
questioned defendant, Genovevo Salinas, about the 1992 murders of two 
brothers, whose house he visited the night before their murders.85 Salinas 
voluntarily accompanied police to the station for nearly an hour of 
precustodial questioning.86 But when police asked Salinas whether the shell 
casings at the scene would match his shotgun, Salinas fell silent.87 
According to the police officer questioning him, Salinas “[l]ooked down at 
the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his 
lap, [and] began to tighten up.”88 After a few moments of silence, the 
officer moved to another line of questions, which Salinas answered.89 Days 
after his interview, police gathered sufficient evidence to charge him with 
murder when they obtained a statement from a man who claimed he heard 
Salinas confess to the killings.90 However, by this point Salinas had 
disappeared.91 After evading capture for fifteen years, Salinas was found 
living in the Houston area under an assumed name.92 He was eventually 
charged and tried for the brothers’ murders in 2007.93 Salinas did not testify 
at trial, and thus there was no opportunity to use evidence of his prior 
silence to impeach him. However, during their closing argument, and over 
the defense’s objection, prosecutors suggested Salinas’s precustodial 
silence was substantive evidence of his guilt.94 
The jury convicted Salinas, and he appealed to the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals on the ground that use of his silence in a precustodial 
 
83 Griffin, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Ryan, supra note 59, at 907.  
84 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
85 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013). 
86 Id. at 2178; Aurora Maoz, Note, Empty Promises: Miranda Warnings in Noncustodial 
Interrogations, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1316 (2012) (discussing that Miranda rights only 
apply when the subject is in custody and subject to interrogation). For more information on 
whether an interview is considered custodial or noncustodial, see United States v. Cavazos, 
No. 12-4701, slip op. (4th Cir. June 21, 2013) (illustrating that officers often read suspects 
their rights in noncustodial investigations as well).  
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interview violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.95 
While acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court had not 
decided the issue,96 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals nonetheless relied 
on Justice Stevens’s Jenkins concurrence in holding there was no violation 
of Salinas’s Fifth Amendment privilege.97 The Court reasoned that the Fifth 
Amendment did not protect precustodial silence because the interaction 
with police was not “compelled” within its meaning.98 Salinas again 
appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.99 
The Supreme Court did not address the question the lower courts 
wrestled with: whether substantive use of a suspect’s precustodial silence 
violates the Fifth Amendment.100 Instead, the Court rejected Salinas’s Fifth 
Amendment claim “because [Salinas] did not invoke the privilege during 
his [precustodial] interview.”101 
 
95 Id. 
96 Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).  
97 Id. at 179. 
98 Id. 
99 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
100 Id. at 2179 (plurality opinion). 
101 Id. at 2179. Justice Alito noted that Salinas could not benefit from either of the two 
previously recognized exceptions to the invocation requirement. His silence occurred in a 
precustodial context, not at trial, where the first exception applies. Id. at 2179. Second, 
Justice Alito concluded that a witness “need not expressly invoke the privilege where some 
form of official compulsion denies him a ‘free choice to admit, deny or refuse to answer.’” 
Id. (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 656–57 (1976)). According to Justice 
Alito, Salinas’s interview with the police was voluntary and thus not coercive: he agreed to 
accompany police officers to the station and he was free to leave at any time during the 
interview. Id. at 2180. Thus, such official compulsion was not found in Salinas v. Texas. 
Therefore, the Salinas Court held that unless one explicitly invokes the right to remain silent 
before an arrest, prosecutors can use that silence as evidence of guilt at trial. Id. at 2183–84. 
Furthermore, the Court noted that there is “no ritualistic formula” necessary to claim the 
privilege, but simply remaining silent is not enough. Id. at 2186 (citing Quinn v. United 
States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955)).  
 Conversely, Justice Breyer’s dissent criticized Alito’s invocation argument in three 
different ways. First, it attacked Justice Alito’s argument that precustodial circumstances are 
not inherently coercive. Id. at 2185–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer stated that the 
precustodial setting is often coercive. Many people are nervous or distrustful of police, and 
the unfamiliar circumstances surrounding a police headquarters or police questioning may 
prove unnerving. Id. Breyer argued that the standard should be whether one can “fairly infer 
from an individual’s silence” that he is asserting a constitutional right. Id. at 2191. 
Circumstances, not express invocation, trigger the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2189. Second, 
Justice Breyer asserted that there was no special reason the police had to know whether 
Salinas was relying on the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2190. Breyer noted the irony of not 
allowing one to assert their right to remain silent by actually being silent. Salinas’s silence 
was “sufficient to put the [government] on notice of the apparent claim of the privilege.” Id. 
at 2190 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955)). Third, Breyer asserted 
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C. SALINAS: THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE, BREYER’S DISSENT, AND THE 
USE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
The standard constitutional approach to the admissibility of a 
defendant’s silence requires a court to make two key inquiries.102 First, to 
assess the extent of compulsion, a court determines whether the suspect was 
questioned in a coercive atmosphere that may have resulted in compelled 
testimony.103 Second, if a court finds compulsion, it then examines whether 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was invoked as a 
“reasonable response” to this coercive atmosphere.104 
This two-pronged approach may be applied either broadly or narrowly 
with respect to the Fifth Amendment. The primary difference between the 
broad and narrow views turns on whether one believes precustodial 
encounters with law enforcement to be coercive and police-dominated. 
1. The Narrow Constitutional Approach 
While the plurality opinion in Salinas did not rule on the issue 
presented, Justice Thomas’s concurrence, in which Justice Scalia also 
joined, argued that the Court should have applied a narrow constitutional 
approach to reach its holding that evidence of Salinas’s silence was 
admissible. Both Justices approved of the prosecution’s substantive use of 
Salinas’s precustodial, pre-Miranda silence,105 and they argued for this view 
on constitutional grounds. Justice Thomas advocated overruling Griffin, 
which held that the prosecution cannot use a defendant’s failure to testify at 
trial as evidence of guilt.106 Thomas reasoned that, based on the plain 
language of the Fifth Amendment, a defendant is not compelled to testify 
against himself “simply because a jury has been told that it may draw an 
 
there are two circumstances when a Court should insist a defendant expressly invoke the 
Fifth Amendment: first, when circumstances surrounding the silence do not give rise to an 
inference that the defendant intended to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, and second, 
when the questioner had a special need to know whether the defendant sought to rely on the 
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2186–87. According to Justice Breyer, neither was the case with 
Salinas, whose silence should have been sufficient to invoke his right to remain silent.  
102 Ciarelli, supra note 29, at 666. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. A brief discussion of the invocation requirement may be found in the Introduction. 
Any discussion of the Court’s invocation requirement holding is beyond this Comment’s 
scope.  
105 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
106 Id. (“[Griffin] ‘lacks foundation in the Constitution’s text, history, or logic’ and 
should not be extended.” (citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 341 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting))).  
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adverse inference from his silence.”107 Therefore, Thomas’s concurrence 
heavily relied on a narrow view of the Fifth Amendment108 in concluding 
there is no compulsion inherent in the precustodial context which triggers 
Fifth Amendment protections. 
Those who narrowly construe the Fifth Amendment argue that 
precustodial interrogation is not coercive, and that the Fifth Amendment 
only protects against government acts which compel an individual to 
incriminate himself.109 Adherents of the narrow view argue the prosecution 
should have the right to use evidence of precustodial silence because 
government agents do not typically compel suspects to remain silent in such 
circumstances.110 Furthermore, they argue that the precustodial context is 
not compulsive because the suspect is “free to leave at any time.”111 In sum, 
they argue that the government presenting evidence of precustodial silence 
as evidence of guilt “does not rise to the level of compulsion proscribed by 
the Fifth Amendment.”112 Preliminary investigations are a crucial part of 
law enforcement, and therefore, the Fifth Amendment should not strip the 
police or other law enforcement of this power. The narrow perspective 
argues that “an individual’s decision to remain silent is both voluntary and 
within his exercise of free will.”113 
2. The Broad Constitutional Approach 
Conversely, those who broadly construe the Fifth Amendment, such as 
Justice Breyer in his Salinas dissent, assert that the precustodial context is 
inherently coercive.114 This assertion acknowledges that the threat of future 
prosecutorial comments concerning a suspect-turned-defendant’s silence 
sometimes compels an individual to speak, and possibly to incriminate 
himself.115 If silence is admissible as a means of proving guilt, for example, 
then a defendant may feel the only way to correct the misconception that his 
silence evidences his guilt would be to take the stand.116 
Furthermore, adherents to the broad Fifth Amendment view assert 
there is an impermissible “penalty imposed” on an individual’s Fifth 
 
107 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
108 See supra note 11–14 and accompanying text.  
109 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (plurality opinion).  
110 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hale, supra note 10, at 435.  
111 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180.  
112 Stewart, supra note 25, at 204.  
113 Id. at 205.  
114 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
115 Stewart, supra note 25, at 199. 
116 Id. 
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Amendment rights when this silence is admitted at trial.117 For example, this 
view would argue Salinas was penalized for exercising his right to remain 
silent in the face of police questioning, because this silence was later used 
against him to infer guilt.118 Thus, they interpret the Fifth Amendment to 
prevent a suspect’s silence from being used against him in court.119 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit (which takes a broad view) held in 
United States v. Whitehead that “the right to remain silent is derived from 
the Constitution and not from the Miranda warnings, and since the 
Constitution applies in all situations, including precustodial ones, a 
prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s precustodial silence violates the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.120 In short, the privilege against self-
incrimination would be rendered ineffective if the prosecution could use an 
accused’s silence against him.121 
One suggestion is that the Supreme Court should formally adopt a 
compulsion test similar to the first prong of the aforementioned approach, 
which would permit a jury to draw “rational inferences” from silence that is 
not in response to pressure from law enforcement.122 Another proposal 
suggests courts examine the scope of detention, the length of detention, the 
defendant’s state of mind, and how a reasonable person would view the 
circumstances at the time.123 However, such approaches are needlessly 
complex compared to the evidentiary analysis this Comment prescribes. 
II. ANALYSIS: COURTS SHOULD USE EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS TO 
DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRECUSTODIAL SILENCE ON A CASE-BY-
CASE BASIS 
Thirty-three years after deciding Jenkins, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Salinas. It appeared the Court would finally address whether 
substantive use of a suspect’s precustodial silence violates the Fifth 
 
117 See supra note 67. 
118 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (plurality opinion).  
119 See infra Part II(a).  
120 United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2000). 
121 The Idaho appellate court case, State v. Kerchusky, 67 P.3d 1283 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2003), is instructive here. The prosecution argued that the defendant’s precustodial silence 
should be admissible because it was being offered to show that he was not surprised at the 
reference to the bank robbery, and he therefore must have had prior knowledge of the 
robbery. Id. at 1289. However, the court rejected this argument, saying the only reason for 
the prosecution to show the defendant had prior knowledge would be to thereby imply he 
must have been the robber. Id. 
122 Ciarelli, supra note 29, at 672. 
123 Id. at 679–80. 
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Amendment.124 However, the Court did not rule on the issue, instead 
resolving Salinas on other grounds.125 The Supreme Court should have held 
in Salinas that courts should use an evidentiary analysis to determine 
whether precustodial silence should be used in a prosecutor’s case-in-chief. 
The Salinas Court should have held that evidentiary analysis on a 
case-by-case basis is the best approach to determine the admissibility of 
precustodial silence for several reasons. 
First, the Federal Rules of Evidence are a widely respected and utilized 
body of rules that are concise and easily applicable to numerous evidentiary 
situations. Under Rule 401, evidence is admissible only if it is relevant.126 
Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”127 Evidence is measured in terms 
of its “probative value”: that is, how supportive it is of the fact sought to be 
proved.128 Even if evidence (in this case, precustodial silence) is relevant, 
the evidence may still be excluded under Rule 403 if it is unfairly 
prejudicial.129 The Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence explain that “‘[u]nfair prejudice’ within [the context of Rule 403] 
means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”130 
Second, courts have already shown some willingness to use 
evidentiary analysis. As early as 1957, the Supreme Court recognized that 
the evidentiary issue with precustodial silence had “grave constitutional 
overtones.”131 Since then, the Supreme Court, some circuit courts, and 
several state courts have shown at least some willingness to use evidentiary 
analysis to resolve questions regarding the admissibility of precustodial 
silence in lieu of the constitutional approach favored by the Salinas 
 
124 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013). For example, in 2000, the Court denied 
certiorari on Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000), in which the Sixth Circuit 
had held that “the use of a defendant’s prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt 
violates the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” 
125 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
126 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
127 Id. 
128 Advisory Committee’s Note to FED. R. EVID. 401. 
129 FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence”). 
130 Advisory Committee’s Note to FED. R. EVID. 403. 
131 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 423 (1957). 
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Court.132 Furthermore, many courts applying evidentiary analysis have held 
that precustodial silence is not probative of guilt.133 
In Weitzel v. State, for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
utilized evidentiary analysis to conclude that “pre[custodial] silence in 
police presence is inadmissible under Maryland evidence law as direct 
evidence of guilt.”134 Defendant Weitzel remained silent as he heard his 
friend tell a police officer that Weitzel had thrown the victim down the 
stairs.135 Prosecutors attempted to use this evidence to illustrate Weitzel’s 
guilt.136 The court reasoned that precustodial silence in the presence of an 
officer was “too ambiguous to be probative.”137 The court noted that 
“silence is the natural reaction of many people in the presence of law 
enforcement,” and hence “[w]hile silence in the presence of an accuser or 
non-threatening bystanders may indeed signify acquiescence in the truth of 
the accusation, a defendant’s reticence in police presence is ambiguous at 
best.”138 Other courts have reached similar conclusions using at least 
partially evidentiary grounds.139 The Weitzel court stated in sum that 
precustodial silence is not a “tacit admission” and should not be treated as 
such.140 
 
132 See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 286 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Even if Combs’s counsel 
failed to realize that use of the ‘talk to my lawyer’ statement as substantive evidence of guilt 
might be unconstitutional, counsel still should have objected to the statement on evidentiary 
grounds.”);  State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (Idaho 1998) (“The constitutional right 
against self-incrimination is not absolute, however, and applies only when the silence is used 
solely for the purpose of implying guilt.”); State v. Leach, 102 Ohio St.3d 135, 2004-Ohio-
2147, 807 N.E.2d 335, at ¶ 34 (Ohio 2004) (“A defendant’s pre[custodial] silence is 
inherently ambiguous and, therefore, not probative of guilt.”);  Hartigan v. Commonwealth, 
522 S.E.2d 406, 408–10 (Va. Ct. App. 1999);   Spinner v. State, 75 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wyo. 
2003) (“[I]ndeed, the substantive use of ‘silence’ is generally of minimal probative value.”). 
133 See Weitzel v. State, 863 A.2d 999, 999–1000 (Md. 2004); Hartigan v. 
Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 406, 410 (Va. Ct. App. 1999); Spinner v. State, 75 P.3d 1016, 
1025 (Wyo. 2003).  
134 Weitzel v. State, 863 A.2d 999, 999–1000 (Md. 2004). 
135 Id. at 1000. 
136 Id. 
137 This holding overruled the court’s previous decision in Key-El v. State, 709 A.2d 
1305 (Md. 1998). In that case, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled based on the tacit 
admission rule, which is premised on the assumption that an individual will not remain silent 
in the face of an accusation if he believes himself to be innocent. Weitzel, 863 A.2d at 1002. 
138 Weitzel, 863 A.2d at 1004–05. 
139 See State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (Idaho 1998); Hartigan v. Commonwealth, 522 
S.E.2d 406, 409 (Va. Ct. App. 1999); Spinner v. State, 75 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wyo. 2003).  
140 Weitzel, 863 A.2d at 1002 (rejecting the tacit admission rule and noting that “[w]e 
think the better view is that the evidence is too ambiguous to be probative when the ‘pre-
[custodial] silence’ is in the presence of a police officer, and join the increasing number of 
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In United States v. Hale,141 the Supreme Court also rejected the tacit 
admission rule, which assumes that an innocent man would deny a serious 
charge, and therefore, that a suspect silent in the face of an accusation has 
tacitly admitted the crime. The Hale Court noted the tacit admission rule 
did not withstand scrutiny because “[“[i]n most circumstances silence is so 
ambiguous that it is of little probative force. For example, silence is 
commonly thought to lack probative value on the question of whether a 
person has expressed tacit agreement or disagreement with 
contemporaneous statements of others.”142 The Court further reasoned it is 
illogical to infer guilt from silence.143 The Court stated that normally, 
[s]ilence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation, since 
it is assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be more likely than not to 
dispute an untrue accusation. Failure to contest an assertion, however, is considered 
evidence of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances 
to object to the assertion in question.144 
Third, a case-by-case analysis is the best approach to resolve the 
precustodial silence question of admissibility because there may be strong 
arguments for admitting or banning such evidence depending on the factual 
circumstances of a given case. 
For example, proponents of precustodial silence admissibility as 
substantive evidence of guilt argue the defendant’s choice to remain silent 
is relevant and not prejudicial.145 First, they argue that a prosecutor’s 
comment on a defendant’s precustodial silence is only one piece of 
evidence the factfinder assesses before reaching a final conclusion.146 
Indeed, while there could be many reasons for one’s silence, Justice 
Marshall noted in Jenkins that favorable inferences could be drawn from 
precustodial silence.147 Proponents of admissibility also point to Rule 403’s 
demanding standard: only evidence which rises to the level of being 
unfairly prejudicial will be excluded.148 Thus, one could imagine factual 
circumstances where precustodial silence would be relevant to the case-in-
chief and not prejudicial to the suspect-turned-defendant. 
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Conversely, advocates of banning the substantive use of precustodial 
silence on evidentiary grounds are more persuasive. Evidence of 
precustodial silence is too ambiguous to be probative of guilt.149 Justice 
Marshall commented that fear of false accusations and general nervousness 
are conceivable reasons for a suspect’s silence in the precustodial 
context.150 Silence is not “demonstrative of a particular thought or belief,” 
and therefore it is quite unreliable when compared to other forms of 
evidence.151 Silence is only “circumstantial” evidence, and “argumentum ex 
silentio,” the idea that you can make an argument through silence, is a 
logical fallacy.152 Other social science research suggests that non-verbal 
clues such as silence are not probative of guilt or truthfulness.153  
Furthermore, “a defendant likely believes that he has the right to 
remain silent before he is informed of his right and undoubtedly believes 
that his silence cannot be used against him even if he is not read his 
rights.”154 As the Key-El Court noted, the underlying assumption that an 
innocent person always objects when confronted with a baseless accusation 
is “inappropriately simple.”155 Moreover, the argument that silence suggests 
guilt rests on the false assumption that an innocent suspect will never 
remain silent. Such an assumption is greatly undercut by the myriad 
explanations for one’s silence, especially in the precustodial context. 
Even if silence is probative in a given situation, and therefore satisfies 
Rule 401, some courts argue it should nonetheless be inadmissible under 
Rule 403 due to its potential to create unfair prejudice.156 The Supreme 
Court has cautioned that a jury is likely to attach more weight to one’s 
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silence than is warranted.157 In People v. DeGeorge, the New York Court of 
Appeals stated that jurors “may not be sensitive to the wide variety of 
alternative explanations for a defendant’s pretrial silence,” and may give the 
evidence “much more weight . . . than is warranted,” creating a substantial 
risk of prejudice.158 For example, a New York City jury would likely be 
unfairly prejudiced towards a defendant suspected of terrorism if it knew 
about the defendant’s refusal to answer authorities’ questions at an airport. 
Under these circumstances, evidence of the defendant’s silence may be 
unfairly prejudicial such that the jury may give the evidence more probative 
value than it deserves. If a suspected terrorist remains silent while 
authorities questioned him at an airport, a jury could be unfairly prejudiced 
against him and could think that his silence in that situation is evidence of 
guilt.159 Jurors often assign great weight to silence; in some cases, “even a 
defendant’s explanation for his silence would be insufficient to overcome [a 
jury’s] prejudice.”160 
CONCLUSION 
If the Supreme Court were to adopt an evidentiary approach to 
precustodial silence, proponents of both the broad and narrow constitutional 
approaches would likely criticize that decision. Some may argue that in 
avoiding the question of whether a prosecutor can use a suspect’s 
precustodial silence to infer guilt, the Court is condoning this prosecutorial 
tactic. Thus, proponents of the broad constitutional approach to precustodial 
silence might contend that the Salinas Court’s refusal to rule that 
precustodial silence is always inadmissible erodes citizens’ Fifth 
Amendment rights anyway. 
Conversely, many who agree with the Salinas plurality claim the Fifth 
Amendment was never meant to apply in precustodial situations. They 
argue that the Salinas dissenters advocated for an overly-expansive right 
that heavily burdens law enforcement. Thus, the evidentiary solution will 
likely satisfy few commentators. 
Additionally, an evidentiary approach might dissatisfy the general 
public. If a prosecutor were to introduce evidence that the suspect, prior to 
being in custody, remained silent in response to numerous allegations and 
questions, it is likely such silence would be found irrelevant under Rule 
401, and even if the silence is deemed relevant, a court may very well find 
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the silence unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. It is easy to see how this 
might draw public ire in a highly publicized trial. 
Indeed, Salinas himself managed to evade arrest for over fifteen years. 
This is a piece of evidence a jury may find quite repellent. But evidence of 
evading arrest will be subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence before it is 
admitted in court. Courts should similarly apply standard evidentiary 
analysis to evidence of precustodial silence to determine if it will aid the 
jury in determining innocence or guilt. When one puts aside the 
constitutional rhetoric, it is clear that the evidentiary approach is the most 
viable way of resolving this question. 
While the Supreme Court has thus far resisted such an approach in 
favor of a constitutional analysis, state courts that have taken an evidentiary 
approach to determine the admissibility of silence often hold it inadmissible 
on these grounds. A constitutional analysis is a poor roadmap for analyzing 
whether precustodial silence is admissible. When silence is examined for 
admissibility, an evidentiary analysis provides a simple and standard 
approach that can be replicated and applied to any set of facts to determine 
whether precustodial silence is admissible in a given case. The evidentiary 
approach is also flexible enough to account for the limited situations where 
precustodial silence is probative and not highly prejudicial, and should thus 
be admitted. 
However, under the evidentiary approach, most evidence of 
precustodial silence will likely be excluded from the prosecutor’s case-in-
chief. The support for this conclusion is two-fold: first, silence is rarely 
probative because there are a variety of reasons for one’s silence, and 
second, even if the silence is deemed relevant under Rule 401, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that such silence is often “highly prejudicial” from a 
jury’s standpoint. In closing, evidentiary analysis of precustodial silence 
provides courts with an easily repeatable, fact-specific test to analyze this 
question. While some courts already use evidentiary analysis when dealing 
with questions of precustodial silence admissibility, such analysis should be 
ubiquitous within the court system. The way for this ubiquity to take hold is 
obvious: the next time the Supreme Court is presented with the question of 
whether a defendant’s precustodial silence may be used as substantive 
evidence of his guilt, the Court must not fail to act like it did in Salinas. The 
Court should use an evidentiary analysis to determine admissibility. 
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